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4
NATO's ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR: Is THE ALLIANCE OBSOLETE?
Benjamin Forster
Sin ce th e outbreak of th e " W ar on T err o r" follo wing the Se ptem be r l l th terrori st at-
tacks, NATO has been stru gglin g to rapidly adapt its political and military strategies In ord er
to [Ice th e transformed threat of global terrorism . NATO has ind eed developed innovati ve
new ways of tackling th e issue of global terrori sm. th ough it faces a number of significant
difficulties, w hic h, if not addressed, w ill likely mean that NATO will be a minimall y effec-
tive force in th e fight again st global terrori sm.
In th e analysis th at follows, I wi ll fIrst exa m ine two important outcomes of th e 2002
Pragu e sum mit of the Eu ro-Atlanti c Partnersh ip Council (EAPC): th e Allianc e's Mil itary
Concept for Defense against T errorism (MCDT ) and the Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism (PAPT ). Together th ese comprise NATO's first fram eworks for addressing th e
issue of terro rism. As w e w ill see, though both pro vide much need ed basic fram eworks
in o rde r for N ATO to address th e issue of te rrori sm effect ively, eac h presents uniqu e di f-
ficulti es th at must be addressed if NATO is to have a significant ro le in the broader W ar
on T err o r. I w ill th en exa mi ne SOIne of th e pract ical applicatio ns of th e Pragu e sunu nit 's
fram ew orks, such as NATO counterterro rism and antiterroris m operations , as w elJ as th e
Allian ce' s int elligence and co nseq uence managem ent capabilities. Fin ally, I conclude by ex-
amining four separate shortcomings of NATO's current counterterr o rism and antiterrori sm
capab ilities: NATO's lack of a coherent counterrerro rism poli cy, falte ring intelligence capa-
biliti es, di sconnect amo ngs t member states du e to separate nation al loyalti es and th e illusive
nature of terrori sm , and possible diffi culties assoc iated with , and th e larger impli cati on s of
increased int ernational coope ratio n .
In thi s paper I will not focus on NATO 's participation in Afghanistan, but rath er
NAT O 's ro le in preventing and countering th e type of terrori sm seen during th e 2001
World Trade Center att acks, th e 2004 Mad rid bombing, and the 200 5 London bombing.
Thu s, th e "War on Terro r" as used in thi s analys is w ill refer to th e broader glo bal fight
ag;linst ter rori sm, and not sim ply the U S-led W ar o n Terror. This pap er w ill also refer to
antiterro rism . and cou nterterro rism . In thi s ana lysis, antiterrori sm w ill refer to preventa-
tive , deffn sive measures taken to pre vent atta cks (such as th e use of survei llance), w he reas
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counte rterro rism w ill refer to th e use of pr eemptive offensi ve actio n to pr event ,1 possib le
ter rori st atta ck.
2002 PRAGUE SUMMIT
While th e NATO collect ive defense frdme w ork had m ade pr eviou s atte m pts at ad -
dressing the issue of international terrorism , m ost notabl y ill the Alliance 's 1999 Strategi c
C o nce pt. til e Alliance's fmt fo rma l address of tile issue wa s at th e 2002 NATO Pragu e sum-
m it m eeting of th e EAP C (de N evers). During that sum mi t, th e Alliance established w hat
has become NATO 's o ffic ial policy to wa rds terrori sm . namely th e Military Concept for
Defense against T errorism , and th e Partnership Anion Plan agains t Terrori sm. While there
are a number of sign ificant sho rtcom ings of th ese plans, in line with the strat egies develop ed
by th e EAPC at th e Pra gu e sun mut , NATO has played a sma ll but significa nt role In th e
broade r War o n Te rro r, pa rticularl y th rou gh an ti te rro rism o pe rations.
Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT)
The 2002 Prague summit meeting's Military Concept for Defense aga inst Terrorism
(M C D T ) pla n stipulates th at "all members [will] hav e th e primary responsibility for the
defense of th eir populati ons and infrastructu res" whi le NATO w ill play d m uch more sup-
porti ve role for indi vidual nati on s' co u nte rte rro rism and ant ite rrorism initi at ives (" NATO's
M ilitary C oncep t" ) . The M C D T outlined fo ur different role s for NATO 's mi lit ary o pe ra-
tions: defense m easures (antiterrorism), co nsequence lllan agement, co un terterrorism , and
military coope ration (w ith non-military forces as well ) with further NATO assistance di c-
tated by th e No rth Atlant ic C o unc il (K uz ma nov) . As stip ulated by th e M C DT, specifically,
defe nse m easures (ant i- terro rism) include intelligen ce sharing; co nseq uence managem enr
co nsists of post-att ack containment and d isaste r reli ef (in the case of a nuclear , biol ogi-
cal, or chemi cal w eapo n att ack); counterterrori sm consists o f "offensi ve military acti on in
w hic h NATO either play s a support ive or le.id role" th rou gh out-of-ar ea operations o r
pre-emptive strikes; fin ally, milirary coopera tio n co nsists bo th of int cr-ru ember (J S w ell as
no n-me m be r) civilian law e nfo rce m ent and military coope ratio n, JS well as strictly tradi -
tional inter-member (and no n-member) mil itary cooperatio n (D eni) (" N AT O 's M ilitary
C o ncep t") .
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT)
The sum mi t's Partnersh ip Ac tio n Plan against T errori sm (PA PT) has become th e main
platfo rm for j oi n t Partner s for Peace (PIP) and NATO m ember coo peration in addressing
th e issue of ter ronsiu, with add itio nal efforts made to co operate with n on PiP or N ATO
m embers (K uzma no v) . The PA PT has provid ed a five point framework fo r co nt inued inter-
nati onal coope ratio n. These areas include : inten sified co nsulta tio ns an d information sha ring,
enhanced pr ep aredness fo r com bating terrorism , th e need to impede suppo rt for ter rorist
gro ups, to e nha nce capabil ities to contribu te to conseque nce manageme nt, and assistance
to partners' effo rts against terr orism ("Pdrtnership Acti on Plan agamsr T errorism"). The
PA PT has also established th e need for close NATO and non NATO m ember cooperati on,
th rou gh politi cal, logistical, eco no mic, and tec hno logical (adapting co- compatible milita ry
technologi es) m eans . C lea rly th e PAPT is an important leg,tl step in establishi ng th e coop-
eratio n necessary for effective antiterrorism and co un terterrorism o pera t io ns, th ou gh it also
p resents sign ificant problems that \",1111 be d iscussed later in thi s analysis,
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NATO's OPERATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
The practi cal application of these NATO initiatives in fighting terrorism has had lim-
ited success. Perhaps NATO's two largest roles m th e more broadly defi ned War on Terror
have been throu gh anti-terrorism operations aim ed at deterring terrori st attacks, as well as
th rou gh co nsequence mana gement (aiding mem bers III the event of a terrori st attack). The
M C DT, and parti cula rly th e PAPT's plan of close coo peration amongst NATO , and PfP
members h,IS been a key co m po nent of both of these roles. I w ill also ex am ine some o f the
rece nt changes in N ATO 's in relligence capahilities as well as its limited role 111 co untc rre r-
ronsm.
Counterterrorism
Wi th regard s to co u nterte rro rism operations, N AT O , as stipulated in th e- M CDT,
has taken on a very "supporti ve" ro le in the broader W ar o n T er ro r, and has therefore had
a m in imal rol e in o ffensive opera tion s. T o date, N ATO 's o nly major offe nsive Art icle 5
ope ratio n has been in Afghanistan where it h.is played ,I largely suppo rtive role of the US
(Kuzmano v). Whil e thi s study of NATO's ro le in th e b roade r W ar o n T error will not ex-
am ine NA T O's operatio ns in Afghani stan in deta il, it is important to no te that N AT O has
played a prominent role in counterterro rism hy training civilian and military personnel both
in Iraq an d Afghani stan. Such training has pr im arily co nsisted of bomb detecti on techniques,
pol icing procedures, etc. Perhaps one of NAT O's largest o rganizatio nal shifts 111 the area of
co u nte rte rro rism , specifically in executing non -Article 5 pre- emptive strike missions, was
its development of the NATO Response Force (N R F) during the Prague summit. Article 5
of th e N orth Atlantic Treaty states NATO's clear ro le as a collec tive defense organization,
that an "arm ed attack against one or more of th eiu [members] in Europe or North America
sh ~J1 1 be co nsidered an attack against th em all" ("T he N orth Atl anti c Treaty"). In this sense,
the op erating natu re of the NRF is a clear depa rture from NATO 's more traditional reactive
role. T he NRF, w hile not without significant op eratio nal limi tat ion s rhur will he discussed
later, is N ATO's "state of th e art for ce" that will allo w the Allian ce to rapidly respond
to terro rist th reats. This me ans th at the N RF would act as a tip o f th e spe ar action for ce
co m prised o f th e best of the Allian ce 's m ilitary forces, and would act in accordance wi th
N AC mandates. T he go al o f the NRF is to engage members and non members int o m or e
proacti ve , rath er than react ive engage me nts o f te rrori st threats ("T he N ATO R espon se ").
Antiterrorism: NATO's Intelligence Capabilities, Operation Active Endeavour, and Op-
eration Eagle Assist
N ATO 's two most prominent ant iterrori sm o pe rat io ns to dat e ha ve been O pe ratio n
Eagle Assist, and Operation Acti ve E nd eavour, bo th o f w hich were am ong N ATO 's first
act io ns foUowing the l) /1 1 terrorist atta cks. T hey are key examples o f NATO 's antiterror-
ism strateg y III action (de N evers). Eagle Assist , which lasted from October 200 l to Ma y
20 02, gave dir ect surveillance suppo rt to the U S by deploy ing seven NATO AWAC S air-
craft over American soil. III all, R30 NATO cre w members rep resenting 13 member nati ons
particip ated ll1 the operation which flew over 360 so rt ies ove r the US. Since Operation E a-
gle Assist, NATO's A WACS squadron s have part icip ated III providing airborne sur veillan ce
for events such as the 2004 Olympic Ca llies in Athen s, G ree ce , the Spanish Royal W edding
ill M adrid , Spain , the 200(, Olympi c Ca ine s in Turin , Italy, and others (Kuzmanov) .
O pe ration Active Endeav or began p rim ari ly as a NATO naval operation 111 the Eastern
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M ed iterranean , and began in 200 1 as J "deterrent and surveillance m easure in support o f US
int er ventio n in Afgh anistan " (de Nevers). Active E ndeavo u r wa s seen also as a w ay to pre-
ve nt possib le terro rist atta ck s fro m Lib ya, and Syria , which , as o f 2003, w ere consid er ed by
th e U S to be haven s for terro rist gro ups (Kuz rn anov) . By 200(" the O peratio n had e xpanded
to includ e no n N ATO m embers suc h as Russia, w hich briefly parti cipa ted in pat roll ing th e
Eas tern M ed iterran ean in 200() and 2007_ T oday Active Endeavour has expa nded signi fi-
elntl y th ro ughout th e ent ire M editerranean, primarily as a symbol ic gesture o f NATO 's
contin ued resolve to cou n ter inte rnatio nal te rro ri sm . But the Opera tio n is much m o re th an
sim ply a sym bolic ges tur e : NATO patrols have part icipated m sea rch an d seizure of suspe ct
ruarerials, pr c ve nred d rug sln ug gling and w ea po ns trafficki ng, and th e operatio n h as been
extre m ely successfu l in guarding ov er 65 perce nt o f W estern Europe' s oi l su pply, whic h is
tr an spo rted th rou gh th e M ed iterra nea n . Acti ve End eavour has also allo w ed for in creased
close cooper atio n with Egypt , M orocco , J ord an , Israel an d other states that are active ly
seeki ng to co m bat te rrorism in th eir resp ecti ve co u nt ries ("Operati o n Active Endeavo u r" ).
N AT O has also revam ped its intelligence capab ilit ies to m eet the new threats posed by
ter ro rism , tho ug h w ith significant limitati ons. N ATO itself is severely limited in the field
of in tell igen ce as it itself d o es not co llect "raw intellige nce", b ut rath er relies o n its m eni -
her cou nt ries' o w n dom estic in te llige nce serv ices . In ,HI effort to be tter po ol intell igen ce
gathered frolll vario us m em ber nat ions, in 200::1 NATO esta blished a Terrori st T hr eat In tel-
ligence Uni t along w ith an NATO Intelligen ce Fusio n Cen ter to co o rdinate int elligen ce
gath er ed by members (D eni). This initiati ve, w h ile a step i n th e righ t direction , wa s m et
w ith sign ificant diffi culti es w hich will be exa m ine d in depth later. NATO's Multinati on al
Battl efield Info rm.itio n and E xp loitat ion System (M BrES) is also a way fo r NAT O to pool
intell ige nce resources regarding terrorism , in to a sing le ne tw o rk th at is readil y accessible to
N AT O task forc es (D eni ) .
Consequence Management
NA TO's consequ en ce ma nagcuient plan, in line with th e Prag ue summi t M C DT, has
establi shed a number of m ul tina tional NBC co nt ainm e nt p ro gra m s. O ne of these pr ograms ,
NA T O 's Ci viJ Eme rgency Plann ing Act io n Plan (C E PAP) , is th e Alliance's p re mier pos t
atta ck co n raimne n r p rogram tha t has pooled eno rts fonn a var ie ty o f me mbe rs and Part-
ner s. NATO 's C hemical B io logica l R adi oact ive and N ucl ea r D efense (C BR N) Ba tta lio n.
also established du rin g th e Prague summit , plays a similar role as w ell. Among the primary
o bj ectives o f the CBRN D efense Battali on are the identifi cation o f nu clear , biolo gical, an d
ch emi cal threats, and dec o ntam inatio n op erati o ns (Kuzmano v) . In line with th e Prague
sum m it's co m mi tm ent to in cr eased coope ration bet ween m em be rs and PfP m em bers, 12
d iffere nt nati o ns take part in C BR N rotati onal dep loymen ts, with th e C BRN head quarters
based in and staffed in th e Czech R epu blic (" N AT O's Mul tin at io nal C hemical," ) . Int er est -
ingly, NATO's increased capab ilities in NBC weapo n co nta inmen t, co nseq ue nce m ana ge-
m eu t , and sur veillance , have give n N AT O a hi gger ro le in di saster relief In fact , the Alli -
ance 's Euro-Atlanric D isaster Respo nse C en te r assisted th e U S dunng Hu rri cane Ka tri na,
and Paki stan dunn g th e 2005 earthquake (de N evers).
LIMITATIONS OF NATO's CURRENT ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
D esp ite all of N ATO 's capabilit ies in waging " w ar" agains t te rro rism, it no neth eless
h as sig nifican t limitat ions in its capabilities . T h is sec tio n ana lyzes these sho rtc o m ings in four
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specific areas : co uurerte rro risni. inte llige nce, m ember nation state lo yalties and the natur e
of th e broader W ar o n Terro r, and problem s em anating fro m expanded int ernational co-
o pera tion.
NATO's Lack of a Legal Counterterrorism Provision
In regards to NATO's ope ratio nal capaci ty , NATO 's lack of a pre- emptive co un ter-
terro rism provision in the M C DT, has not o nly limited N ATO to brgely reactive oper a-
tio ns, bu t it has fur tlier e nbrged the gap bet ween US an d NATO capab ilities (de N evers ) .
While th e N orth Atla nti c T reaty's collect ive defen se pla n assures an 'all fo r o ne. o ne fo r
all' suppo rt of m em bers In tile eve nt of a ll arrack , th e Pragu e suuuui t d id not estab lish ,I
legal provision for o ut of area co u nt erte rro rism o perations (no n- Art icle 5), but ruth er stated
that th e decisio n fo r act ion m ust COllie fro m th e NAC , wh ich is inextri cably bound by th e
N orth A tla nt ic Treaty (B ehler) . NATO has thus es tablished it self as a fo rmidable react ive ,
not proac tive force . This has frequ entl y co nflic ted with U S secur ity poli cy w hich , d u riug
the Bush admi nistrati on, was highl y proa ct ive, foc using o n el im inating th rea ts before th ey
su rfaced , as op p osed to NATO 's policy of add ressing thr eats once th ey surface . The US
N ational Se curity Strategy of 2002 and 2006 for exam ple , state : "The fight must be tak en
to th e e nemy " , and e m phasize the need to prev e nt attacks before they occ ur (de N evers) .
It is thus clear tha t desp ite the ex iste nce of th e vario us anti te rro rist (preventative) prog ram s
N ATO has p ur sued follo wi ng ':>/JI, NATO as a for ce in the figlit again st preventing and
elim ina ting global terror is seve rely lacking in this resp ect . The fact th at NATO is largely
a reacti ona ry force , and that it is o ften difficul t to m obilize , sugge sts a m ajor reason w hy
the Bush ad mi nist ratio n d id not see k N ATO aid during th e in vasion o f Afghcl nistcl n . M ost
co untert erro rism efforts am on gst NATO mem bers tod ay occu r bilate rally as a result of th ese
an d other sho rtco mings (Beh ler). The effectivenes s of the NATO R eacti on Force wi ll also
be significan tly co m p ro m ised d ue to the lack of a counterte rrorism provi sion in the M C DT,
and mem ber nat ion s w ill l ikel y be h ighly relu ctan t to take o n an y typ e of action th at m ay
excee d the m an date o f th e N orth Atlan tic Treaty . As John D eni , a U S pol itical ad viso r to
U S forces in Europe notes, despite the im po rta nce of the N R F in NAT O 's co unt erterror-
ism progr<lm, NATO lias r , • • • barely proved able to mu ster th e requisite forces - forces that
th e Alliance it self ident ified as necessar y fo r the NRF to be functi on al .. .including co uu-
terte rro rism [o perati ons]" (Deni). It remain s unc lear w hether thi s lack in req uisite fo rces is
,I d irect resu lt o f NATO 's lack of a legal co unterterro rism pro vision that co uld potentially
o bligate m embe rs to provide fo rces for the NRF. Unless N ATO C I Il successfully add ress
th.is issue, th e Alliance will u ndoubtedly face significant politi cal confli ct wi th the U S (unless
o f co urse U S po licy of pre- emption changes) in years to come.
Alo ng simi lar lines, N ATO 's co nse q ue nce ru.magcinen r operatio ns, suc h as its NBC
co nt ainm ent programs, can o nly be depl o yed upo n co nse nt of th e member nat ion ill w hich
the co ntainm ent operatio n will be depl o yed . While ant iterro rism o peratio ns (pre ve nta-
tive o peratio ns) such as Operat ion Active En deavour are beyo nd th e Article 5 constrain ts
under which co un te rterro rism (pre-em ptive operatio ns) is co nd ucted . it is nonethele ss
co nstra ined, th ough o nly to ,I co m parative ly sm all de gree, by d iffering nati on al lo yalt ies
amongs t m em bers.
Faltering Intelligence Capabilities
Another area in w hic h NA T O 's strategic capabilities are lac kin g is in the area of intel-
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ligen ce. Though, as illustrated earlier, NATO has made a num ber of attempts at creating
intelligence pools , NATO in and of itself has no intelligen ce gath ering capabiliti es o ther
than th rough its AW AC S surveillance operatio ns. As a resu lt , alm ost all of NATO's supplied
inte llige nce com es froln th e U S Intelligence Com m unity . and o the r mem ber states' co un-
terpart o rganizations. As R enee de Ne vers from th e M axwell School at Syracuse Un iversity
poi n ts ou t , not only is NATO lacking in int ellige nce capabi lities, but its m em bers o fte n
hav e' differing values of int elligence. For exam ple, as US and Eu ropean military capabilities
di verge , th e US has become more reliant On real-time Intelligen ce as part of its evo lving
speci alized counterterro rism capabilities. Europ ean allies ho wever. have comparativ ely less
spec ialized program s geared to ward terrori sm and rhu s have a co m parative ly low er value
of real tim e int elligen ce (de N e vers). It sho uld be noted th at thi s d iscrepancy is largel y in-
fluenced by differing threat values placed o n te rrori sm by both th e U S and th e Eu ropean
coium uniry, a confli ct that will be examined in depth later in th is analysis. Furtherm ore ,
th e legal im plications surro unding the gathe rin g of human intelligen ce have caused co n-
fliers bet ween European NATO members and th e US, whi ch ha ve diffenn g views on
what co nstitu tes legal and illegal intelligen ce g'Jthe ring (Behler). These confli ct s within th e
int ell igen ce pooling arm o f N ATO have significan tly impeded upon NAT O 's in telligen ce
capabilities. NATO has tried to remed y thi s situatio n notabl y throu gh its crea tion o f th e
N AT O Int elligence Fusio n Cente r, th ou gh its cre atio n hJS had very littl e pract ical eHect in
easing m ember nati on tensions. Rather , N ATO 's creation of numer ous intelligence po ols
have furthe r added to NATO's bureaucratic thi ck et, and as ;1 result have furth er undermined
NATO 's efficiency.
Diverging Political Interests amongst NATO Members and the Nature of Modern Ter-
rorism
lu tem al discord amongst NATO mem bers p rimarily du e to divergin g nati o nal int er-
ests, co m bined with th e nature of the ter rorist threat itself, illustrate a potential shortcomi ng
of NATO's role in fighting terrorism. All to o frequently, th e co m pe ting and changing na-
tion al age ndas of m ember nations hav e m ade decisive acti on very difficult, m ost notably in
Afghanista n, and will likel y make non -Article 5 pr e-emptive mi ssions extrem ely d ifficult to
execute in th e future . O nce again, it is important to not e th at U S security poli cy is geared
mo re towa rd pr e-emptive m easures wh ile Eu ro pean sec urity pol icy is gea red m or e toward
reacti ve security. This d iscrepancy IS a key facto r 111 expla ini ng th e disconnect that exists
between Europeans and th e US over ho w to best deal with th e terrorist threat (Behler) . In-
deed th er e are oft en "se rio us disagreem ents co ncern ing th e autho rized scope of ope ratio ns
and Ico nce rn ing] several proposed depl oym ents of the IN R F]" (Bebler) . W hile th e US in
recent years has begu n to see the ben efits of multinat ion al coope ratio n, European NAT O
m em bers, o fte n citing th e case of Iraq , are highl y co nce rn ed th at the U S may be tryin g
to ad vance its own policy agenda th rough NAT O (de N evers). Fu rth ermor e , there is also
signifi cant discord bet ween the US and European NATO m emb ers over th e significance
of th e terrorist threat . Fo r exam ple, unlike th e Se ptem ber 11 th terrorist atta cks, th e Madrid
and London terrorist bombi ng s m 2004 aud 2005 resp ecti vely, we re not link ed to Al Qa-
eda, but we re rathe r co nd uc ted by dom estic ter rorist g ro ups (de N evers). M any critics of
NATO's ro le in th e W Jr o n T error cite th is as a reason w hy domestic intelligence services
and civilian poli ce for ces o r eve n an E U spo nso red co unte rt errorism program mi ght be bet-
ter su ite d for dealing wi th such issues rath er tha n N ATO , w hich seems m or e gea red towards
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collecti ve militar y defense (D eni) .
T h is point ties in to th e larger pr oblem th at exis ts: the nature of ter rori st th rea ts th em-
selv es. De spite the m any an tite rro ri sm and co un terterro rism programs developed by NATO
follo wi ng th e Prague summ it, NATO still maintains Its highl y bureaucrati c stru ctur e whi ch
do es no t give it the spee d necessary to respond to terro rist th rea ts. Furtherm ore, as stated
ea rlier, N AT O's co nseq ue nce man agement program s suc h as nu clear, bio logical and chemi-
cal we apo n attac k containmen t m ust h ave the approv al o f the given co untry in which th e
pro gram will operate p rior to its lise . Addi rio nally, while N ATO maint ains its N R F fo rces,
it do es not maintain a small scale paramil itary task for ce w hich might be idea lly suit ed for
hostage crises, and do m estic te rro rism . For these reasons critics often argue th at Internati on al
o rganizations suc h as the E U or the G -8 have develop ed suffic ien t m rer- ageucy co o pera tion
fo r fighti ng terrori sm , and that N AT O need not risk co mp ro m ising its trad itio nal military
funct io na lity in o rder to fight a "war" whic h it is not ideally su ited for (Kuzmanov ). A long
th ese lint's, there has not been , and wil l likely nor be for ma ny years, a clear co nse nsus as
ro whet her NATO, th e EU , bilateral o r unilateral anion is be tt er suited for addressing rhe
h ighl y illusive terrorist th reat. There are indeed many pros and cons of each of th ese alt ern a-
tives, an analysis of w hich is be yond th e sco pe of th is paper alo ne . Given th e internatio nal
natu re o f rerro rist groups such as Al Qaeda today, th e rol e o f international o rga nizatio ns wi ll
be esse ntial. H en ce o ne of th e m ost importan t ro les NATO wi ll play in th e broader War
on T error w ill most defi nitely be irs coope ratio n w ith PH> m ember s, and the cultivati on of
co oper at ive efforts o ut side of the Allian ce and rhe PfP . In this resp ect, th e Alliance 's Part-
nership Action ag;linst T errorism wi ll be a key launch pad from which fu ture cooper at ive
effo rt s o f thi s nature ca n OC CU I".
Difficulties with Expanding NATOMembership and Non-member Cooperation
The downsid e of further intern ati o nal coo pe rat io n is that it wi ll likel y co nflict w ith
NATO 's co llect ive defense role. G iven th e transnational nature of m od ern terrori sm ,
N AT O is highl y uniqu e in that ir is th e most effective inrernarional sec urity organization
in th e wo rld . In a se nse, NATO's uni qu e position raises questions as to w he the r emer g-
ing in terua tional co unte rte rro rism program s, suc h as rhe EU 's R apid R esponse Fo rce , will
be able to achi eve wha t th e Allian ce has (Kuzm anov) . W hatev er the case ma y be, today's
securi ty threats demand everm o re int ern ational co operation. While un ilate ral anio n ma y
avoi d th e co nfines o f add itiona l b ureau cratic red tap e thar is often th e resulr of div ergin g
Int erests amo ngst NAT O m embers, th e use of int erna tiona l coo pe ration provides a lev el o f
lcgirim.icy to m ilit ary interve ntio ns, In fighting modem terrori sm. W esley C lark , fo rm er
Sup reme All ied Commande r Euro pe says, gain ing in ternationa l publ ic ap proval is essentia l
111 launch ing an y successfu l military incursio n (Clark ]()). For exam ple . in th e case of the
current [rag war, uuil areral military actio n has ignited an " us versus th em " mentality in th e
Midd le East by denying rhe cooperation wi th allies thar is necessary for estab lish ing inter-
nati o nal legitim acy (C lark 1(2). Conversely , d ur in g the l 'i lJ() Gulf W ar. coo peratio n w ith
Arab states g,lVe th e incursion th e inte rnatio nal legitim acy necessar y to mak e ir the success
that it was.
Whi le the U S has bac ked signifi cant N AT O ex pansio n , suc h as in 2004, many arg ue
th at NATO's rapid ex pansion is sev er ely co m pro m ising its military cap ab ilities. As de N ev-
ers po int s o ur, foll ow ing N AT O 's 1999 ex pansio n, i t was clear to exi sting m embers th at th e
countri es adm itted , nam ely th e Czech R ep ublic , H ungary, an d POLlIld, we re signifi can tly
NATO's Role in the Global War on Terror
48 BENJAMIN FORSTER Claremont M cKenna College
lack ing in mi lita ry capa bilities by N ATO standards . Foll o wing NATO 's 2004 ex pansio n ,
in w hich Bulgaria , Esto nia, Lat via , Lithuania, Slova kia , Romani a , and Slov e nia became
m embers of the Alli an ce, it was clear th at these countries were even 1I10re lacking in m ilit ury
ca pab ilities, and that th ey were 1I0t abo ut to meet NATO 's minimum m ilitary standard s any
rim e so o n (de N e vers). T he pomr here is th at th e cos t o f ex pansio n, w h ich w ill be esse ntia l
in add ressing th e issu e o f terrorism . ma y ve t)' well be a det eri orati on o f N AT O\ mil itary
standa rds to in clude m ore members and fo ster greate r n on -member coope ratio n .
NATO exp an sio n also poses a threat to NATO 's existin g m ember ship requi rements.
G iven that modern terro nsm does not discriminate be tw een dem ocrati c and non-d em o-
cratic states, it w ill be in cr easin gly difficult for NATO to fo ster close coope ratio n with 1I 0n -
member sta tes , or to allow for th eir m embersh ip if one of NATO \ key requirem ents for
m ember ship is d emocrati c gove rn allce (Be ble r) . H o w ever, th ere are clea r ben efits o f expan-
sio n in regards to ant ite rro rism and co u nte rte rro rism . Ex pa nsio n cou ld po te ntially pro vid e
political and ec onomic stability for eille rgi ng dem o cracies 111 Europe , w h ich is essential in
det e rr ing terrorism from taking ro ot (She a) .
D avid Y ost w arns tha t growing m embership co uld also hav e unintended consequ en c-
es, such as reigniti ng th e NATO-Russia ri val ry as fo rm er Sovie t po w ers e nte r o r ad op t
increasingly clo se cooperat io n w ith NATO (Yost 125). This co uld potentiall y detract from
t he ov erall purpose o f increasing co o peratio n in d ealin g w it h te rro rism. E ven if ex pa nde d
m embership seems lik e a stretch, close co op eratio n in line with the PAP T presents its own
pro blems as w eU. The more PiP and NATO m embers interact with eac h other stri ctl y o n
tr ainin g gro un ds, the g reate r a ro le NATO w ill ha ve in transformi ng non-member mil ita ry
forces to be co-com pa tible . For exa m ple , the PAPT stipulates th e need for in creased politi -
cal and lo gistical co operatio n wi th non-members, and to develop co m pa tible iuilitarv units
th rou gh joint tr aini ng exerc ises (" Pa rt ne rship Act ion Plan agai nst T erro rism") . H en ce , this
will make it increasin gly more diffi cult for NATO members not to int ervene wh en a non-
NATO member is attacked. Further , co llective sec urity implies NATO invol vement In
non - Artic le 5 mi ssio ns w hich could pote ntially cau se" .. .an erosion o f NATO 's co herence
as a collect ive defe nse o rga n izatio n d uring th e pursuit of a diffuse collect ive sec urity ag ree-
m ent " (Y ost 166) .
The risk s asso cia te d with NATO 's increased coope ra tio n w it h non-member s, co u pled
with the necessity o f international cooperatio n in fighting terrorism, begs the qu estion : w hy
NA T eV As m enti oned earlie r, w he n co nside ring th at NATO w as born out of w estern
security fears during th e Cold W ar, it is unlikel y th at any future eve nt s, give n rod ay's po liti-
ca l com plexi ties . th at an eq ually co hes ive collect ive de fe nse o rga niza tio n co uld be crea te d .
W esley Clark po ints o ut that g iven t he diffi cult ies associated w it h bilate ral coope ration , suc h
as differing laws, j ud icial procedures e tc ., that o fte n tim es terrorists w ill be cau ght and re-
leased. According to C lark , "Altrui sm and fellow ship are not enough to briug other nations
fully into th e fig h t ag ainst terrorism , Rather, th eir international ac tions follo w domestic
agendas " (C lark 128). The ve ry nature of NATO as a political-military forum also fo rces
allie s to d evelo p co-com pa tible secur ity poli cies, e ma na ting fro m com mon sec ur ity issu es.
w h ich are in tu rn translated in to domesti c p olicies by forc ing governmen ts to d efen d the i r
international positi ons at howe (C lark 128). B y doing this, NAT O promotes co llective JC -
tion and burden sharing whi ch are esse n tial 111 taking on issues as m assive as transnational
ter rori sm.
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WHERE SHOULD NATO GO FROM HERE?
Whik there are no clea r solu tio ns to m .mv o f th e apparent diffi culti es that NATO will
Illcviubl y (;Ice with regard s to its recent anrircrrorism .uid co un terterro rism progral1ls, th er e
are SOllie so lu tio ns th at suggest th emselves. Perhaps o ne o f NATO 's g reatest we ak nesses
ill the broader War o n T er ror wi Jl be its massive bureaucrati c structu re. Anton Behl er,
from th e U niversity of Lju blj una suggests th at NATO im prove th is by creat ing a sepa rate
forum for counterterrorism within NATO. As Behler suggests, eac h NATO member state
should have its own civilian paramilitary liaison to NATO, which co uld better coordinate
NATO aid to each m em ber's loc al security o r NBC co utainm c nr units as needed. Within
thi s se pa rate forum . Behl er sugg ests. an titerrorism and co unrcrte rro rism decision m ak ing
sh ould be streaml ined by mergin g repetiti ve sub- p rogr.uus (suc h as the num ber o f N ATO 's
inrelligeu ce program s) (Be hler). Whil e NATO 's R eacti on Forces co uld be pot entiall y wel l
equipped to address small scale co nventio nal co nflicts (i.e . through th e use of m o bile infan -
try, m ech ani zed divisions etc.), th ese forces arc not appro p riate in dealing with small scale
operation s such as hosta ge rescue, NBC contain m ent, etc. For thi s reason. smaller scale
NATO paramilitary units w ou ld be better suited fo r sm all sca le co unte rterro rism o pe ra-
tions. If NATO is to be J successful force in fighting terrorism, its m ost critical tasks ahea d
w ill be in addressing th e inhe re nt problems w ith its int elli gence capabilities. to establish a
defmiti ve co unte rte rro rism pr o vision . and to ad dress the issues of internatio nal co operat ion ,
milita ry structure , core doctrines. and interna l d isco nnect amongst member s. H o w ever . d ue
to the crisscrossing nature of the se problems, solving one will lik ely create others in its place .
NATO m em ber s will ha ve to be w ary of thi s as th ey try to adapt existing military and politi-
cal doctrin es and struc tu res, to m eer th e sec ur ity demands of th e 2 1sr ce ntu ry .
CONCLUSION
1n co nclusio n , NATO doc s ind eed have significant antiterro rism capabi lities through
A WAC S o pe rations, NBC co n tainmen t . and military training pro gram s. Toda y's NATO
will be m ost effective 111 th e area of antiterrorism and consequ en ce management, th ou gh it
will also be pa rticu larly effec tive in maintaining active peacekeeping operatio ns. and th rou gh
internati on al coo pe ratio n it will be an extremely useful to ol III providi ng politi cal and eco-
n omic secur ity . Despite th e inherent problems w ith NATO 's cur re nt ro le in fighting ter-
rori sm , th ere is little chance th at an equally effective int ernational sec ur ity o rga n izat io n w ill
em erge an y time soon. As such. NATO will be a vital forum for int ernational coope rati o n
in th e bro ader WJr on T error. and extending NATO cooper ati on to non-membe rs will
be cru cial in elim inating transnational terrori sm . While th e 2002 Prague suuunir was an
Impo rtant first ste p for NATO in reshaping itself to add ress th e issu e of terrorism, in and of
itself it is ( \I' from sufficie nt in addressing all o f NATO 's potential p rob lems w ith regards to
its poli cies o n terrorism . If NATO can addr ess th e problems illu strated in thi s ana lysis effec-
tivel y. it co u ld potentially play d vital and even a leadi ng ro le in th e broad er War o n T erro r.
ApPENDIX A: EXTRACT FROM NATO's PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM
Acti on PLlll
1(L T he spec ific <I n io n items under thi s Pa rtn ershi p Acti on Plan again st Terrorism are listed
belo w: othe r items may be added later. lu rplcmcntat ion o f these acti viti es will be
subject to ap plicable nati onal laws and regul ati ons, th e specific charac te r o f sec ur ity
and de fense poli cies of EAPC Stat es and the princi p les o f inclusive ness and se lf-di ffer-
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en t iatio n .
16.1. Intensify Consultations and Information Sharing
16.1.J . Political consult ations. Allies and Partners will consult reg ularly on their shared se-
curiry co nce rns related to terror ism . Allies w ill nu ke efforts to Illf0l111 Part ners about ,
and/o r seek th ei r views o n, issues relat ed to int ernation al fight again st ter rori sm , be-
ginn ing from th e early stages of Alliance d iscussions. Partners Illay see k, in acco rdance
with agreed pro cedures, direct pol itical co nsultatio ns w ith NATO , in di vid ually or in
smaller groups , on th eir concerns reb ted to terrorism . The consultatio ns and discus-
sio ns will reflect ke y security con cerns o f A.llies and Partn ers, if relev ant to the fight
agaiIlSt terro rism .
16 .1 .2 . Information sharing. EAP C States will inten sify their efforts to share infornia-
tion and vie ws related to terr ori sm , both in EAPC m eetings and in sem inars and
wo rksho ps held un der EAPC /Pfl' auspic es. Lead nation s llIay be in vited to organize
such events. EAPC States note th e establishm ent of an EAPC/PfP Intelligen ce Liaison
Unit (EAPC/PfP ILU). They wilJ promote, in accordan ce with their domestic Jaws,
exc hange of int elligen ce relev ant to terrorist threats.
16.2. Enhance Preparedness for Combating Terrorism
16.2.1. Defense and security sector reform. Partners will int en sify th eir effo rts to devel-
op efficient, dem ocratically- controlled , p rop erl y-stru ctured and wel l-equipped forces
able to contribute to co m bat terrori sm .
16.2 .2. Force planning. Partners inv olv ed in the Partnership for Peace Planning and Re-
view Process (PA R P) will give pri o rity, alllong others, to Partnership G oa ls aimed at
imp ro vin g their capabilities to part icipa te III activ ities against terrori sm . Such Partner-
ship G oals w ill be identified within PARP and wilJ also be co nuu unica ted to Partners
not parti ciparing in the PA.RI' process - for informati on and to enco urage equivalent
effo rts by non-PARP counrries.
16.2 .5. Training and exercises. Partners w ill be invited to participate in trainin g oppor-
tunities and exe rcises related to terro rism to be coordinated by SACEUR I SACLANT.
T o the exte-nt possible . the Partn ership Work Programme will provid e more anti-
terrori sm related o ppo rtunities and activities in the field o f training and exe rcises.
Exerci ses w ill also be used to share expe riences in th e fight again st terro rism.
l(1.2 .6. Armaments co-operation. EAPC States w ill make use of N AT O .mnam ents
co-o peratio n mech ani sms under C N AD , as appropriate, to devel op co nu n on, or as
a minimum interop erable equipment solutio ns to meet the requirements of activities
against terrori sm .
16.2.7. Logistics co-operation. EAPC States w ill make use of N AT O Logistics (o- oper-
arion mechanism s und er the Senio r NATO Logisticians' Conference , as appropri ate.
to develop arrangem ents to pro vide effect ive and efficie nt suppo rt to acti viti es Jgainst
terrorism, in cluding Host Nation Support .
16.4. Enhance Capabilities to Contribute to Consequence Management
16.4 .2. Enhance co-operation in Civil-Emergency Planning
16.4 .3. Military contribution to consequence management.
16.4.4 . Co-operation in non-classified scientific activities for reducing the impact
of terrorism.
j(J.4.5. Co-operation in equipment development and procurement. EAPC States
will take advantage of CNAD gro ups to identify equipm ent requi rements which sup-
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po rt co nsequence man agem ent, after a terrori st attack , and w he re appropriate, co -op-
crate 0 11 th e development ,lnd/o r pro cu rem en t to meet these needs. Emphasi s sho uld
be 0 11 dual usc tech nologies w hich suppor t bo th military and civil req uireme nt s.
16 .5. Assistance to Partners' efforts against terrorism
H).5 .l. Use of the Politi cal Military Steering Committee (PMSC) C lea rin g House
m echanism.
16.5.2. Establish/contribute to PfP Trust Funds. C o nsiste nt with PrP Trust Fun d Po l-
icy, E APC States will co nsider the establ ishment of PrP Tru st Fu nds to assist individu al
mem ber states in specific effo rts agaillS t terrori sm, as envisaged ill the Consolidated
R ep o rt o n the C ompreh en sive R eview of the E uro- Atlantic Part nership Council and
the Partn ership for Peace . Suc h Trust Funds Inay be parti cu larly relevant to Partne rs
fro m Cent ral Asia, th e Ca ucasus and the Ba lkans . T hese project s w ill be implem ented
as a matt er of priority .
16.5. 3. M entoring programmes. EAPC States will develop m entoring progranlll H::S fo r
specific te rro rism- related issues In ord er to share specific experi ences in combatin g te r-
ro rism . E xe rcises 111 the spirit of PrP wi ll also be actively used for sha ring ex periences
in co m bating ter rori sm .
ApPENDIX B: EXTRACT FROM NATO's MILITARY CONCEPT FOR DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM
MILITARY OPERATIONS
C ounter T errorism - G en eral
Counte rte rror ism is offensive milit ary action d esigned to reduce te rrori sts' capa bilities. Al-
lied nat ions ;Igre e that terrori sts sho uld not he allowed to base, train, plan , stage and execute
terror ist actions and th at the th reat l11ay he seve re eno ug h to j ustify acting again st these te r-
rori sts and tho se w ho harbo r th em , as and w here req uired, as decided by th e North Atlant ic
Council. Cou nter terrorist o perations will he mainly Joint op eratio ns and som e units spec ifi-
cally trained in Counter T errorist operations might he extrem ely effective. Furthermor e.
w in ning the trust of th e local populati on th ro ugh Psych olo gi cal Operatio ns and Infor mat ion
O pera tio ns is vital. The Concept add resses two broad ro Jes for NA TO's invol vemen t in
C ounter T erro rist opera t ions:
N ATO in the Lead
NATO in support
C o unte r terro rism - NA TO in the lead
T he Concept states th at in o rde r to cany out succ essful C ounte r T errorism opera tio ns,
NATO mu st have adeq uate Couu naud and Control and int elligen ce structures, as well
as forces trained, exercised and maintained at the appropriate readiness level s. W hile th e
cap abiliti es needed to successfully execute Counte r Terrorist operations are largely a subset
of th ose needed to carry o ut more traditi on al j o int operatio ns, th e manner in whi ch the
co nflict w ill be fou ght w ill be differen t. T herefo re the foll ow ing planning aspects need
special atte nti on:
Procedures and capa bilitie s that support accelerated decision cyc les, in o rde r to be
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succ essful In detecting and attacking tim e sensitive targets in th e Counter T err orist
euviroumenr
Access to flexibl e and capable Joint-Fi res, rang ing from precision-guided stand- off
we apons to direct conventio nal fires
The nee d for mor e spec ialized anri-re rrori st fo rces
ApPENDIX C: EXTRACT FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
Article 5
The Part ies agree that an arme d attack against o ne or 1II0re of rhein III Europe or N orth
Am erica shall be co nside red an atta ck against th em all and conseque ntly the y agr ee that , if
such au arm ed attack occurs, each of them , in exe rcise of th e right of individual o r collec tive
self-defense reco gni zed by Arti cle ,) J o f the C harter of the United Na tio ns, w ill assist the
Part y or Parties so atta ck ed by taking forth with , indi viduall y and in concert w ith the other
Parti es, suc h action as it deem s necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of th e N orth Atlantic area .
An y such armed atta ck and all measure s taken as a result thereofshall in nnediatelv be rep ort-
ed to the Secu rity Cou nc il. Suc h measur es shall be rerminared w hen the Sec u rity C o unc il
has tak en th e mea sur es necessary to restore and maintain int ern ation al peace and sec urity.
Article 6
For th e purpose of Arti cle 5, an armed atta ck 0 11 one or more of th e Parties is deemed to
inclu de an arme d att ack :
o n the territory of any of the Parti es in Europe or North Am eri ca, on th e Alger ian D e-
par rments of Fran ce, o n the territo ry of or on th e lsland s un der the jurisdiction of any
of th e Parties m th e N orth Atlanti c area north of the T ro pic of Ca nce r;
o n th e forces, vessels, o r aircraft of an y o f th e Parties, w hen in or over these territ o ries
or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were sta-
tion ed on the dat e wh en the Treaty entered into force or th e M editerranean Sea or the
N orth Atlantic area north of the T ropi c of C ance r.
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